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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN'S ADMISSION POLICY BUT FINDS
DIVERSITY TO BE A COMPELLING INTEREST
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
I. FACTS
Plaintiffs and petitioners Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both ap-
plied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts (University). t Both applicants were white and resi-
dents of Michigan. 2 Gratz applied in 1995 and was denied admission.3
Subsequently, she applied and was accepted at the University of Michigan
at Dearborn, where she graduated in 1999.4
Hamacher applied for admission to the University for the class of
1997.5 Hamacher was also denied admission and was later admitted to
Michigan State University. 6 Like Gratz, Hamacher also graduated, but in-
tended to transfer to the University at the time the lawsuit was filed.7
The University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts is one of the leading public institutions in the country.8 The University
is a selective institution, meaning that it receives many more applicants than
it can readily admit.9 The University has long promoted diversity through
various means, including recruitment and outreach efforts.10 Because these
methods did not enroll enough minority students, the University decided to
include race as one of many factors in selecting its incoming class.1
1. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The University of Michigan at Dearborn was founded in 1959. About UM-Dearborn:
Overview, at http://www.umd.umich.edu/about/overview.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). The
school has about 8,500 students. Id. The student body is made up of 94% Michigan residents and
the "average" student had an American College Testing (ACT) score of 24 and a 3.4 high school
GPA. About UM-Dearborn: Profile of Enrolled Students, at http://www.umd.umich.edu/about
/profile.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
5. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 251 n.1.
8. Brief for Respondents at 1, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
9. Id. In 1997, the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts received over 13,500
applicants for 3,958 spots. Id. at 1 n.1.
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id. at 4-11.
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The University's Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) oversees
the admissions process.12 To maintain consistency, the OUA issues a set of
written admissions guidelines every year.13 The admissions counselors re-
lied upon these guidelines in making their admissions decisions.14 These
decisions are based on many factors including high school grades, stan-
dardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength, geography,
alumni relationships, leadership, and race. 15 From 1995 to 2003, race in-
cluded African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.16 Further-
more, "'virtually' every qualified applicant from these groups was
admitted. 17
During 1995 and 1996, counselors evaluated applicants according to
SCUGA factors.18 SCUGA awards points for the quality of the applicant's
high school (S), the strength of an applicant's high school curriculum (C),
the applicant's unusual circumstances (U), the applicant's geographical
residence (G), and the applicant's alumni relationships (A).19 These scores
were added to the applicant's GPA to achieve what was called the "GPA 2"
score. 20 The admissions counselor then took this score and consulted the
guidelines chart that had a range of "GPA 2" scores down the vertical axis
and standardized test scores on the horizontal axis.21 The admissions coun-
selor would then find where the applicant's "GPA 2" score and test score
intersected. 22 Once the counselor found the appropriate cell, he or she was
confronted with one of four actions. 23 The counselor could choose to ad-
mit, to reject, to delay for additional information, or to postpone for recon-
sideration. 24 These cells contained different suggestions based exclusively
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7-9. Admissions counselors determined high school quality by looking to factors
such as college attendance rates of graduates, standardized test scores, and advanced placement
courses offered. Id. at 8 n.12. Conversely, curriculum strength is determined by looking at the
course selection of the individual applicant. Id. at 8. An applicant will lose points for selecting
easy courses, but will be awarded points for selecting the most difficult courses. Id.
16. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-54 (2003) (citing Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at l Ila, Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (No. 02-516)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 254.
19. Id.
20. Id. The "GPA 2" score was designed to supplement the regular GPA to provide
counselors with more information upon which to base admissions decisions. Id. By looking to








on race. 25 Consequently, a minority student with the exact same score as a
white student could be admitted, while the white student could be waitlisted
or denied. 26
In 1997, the University modified the admissions procedure to include
additional point values under the "U" category of the SCUGA factors. 27
Applicants could now receive points for being an underrepresented
minority, coming from a socioeconomic disadvantage, attending a pre-
dominantly minority high school, or being under represented in the unit to
which the student was applying. 28 Thus, in 1997, Hamacher's "GPA 2" and
ACT scores placed him in the "delay for admission" category, while a
minority applicant with the same or similar scores would have generally
been admitted. 29
In 1998, the University abandoned the Guidelines Tables and SCUGA
factors, instead basing admissions on a "selection index." 30 This index
consisted of a maximum score of 150 points. 31 The scale was broken down
as follows: 100-150 (admit); 95-99 (admit or postpone); 90-94 (postpone or
admit); 75-89 (delay or postpone); and 74 and below (delay or reject).32
Each applicant received points based on his or her high school GPA,
standardized test scores, academic quality of the applicant's high school,
strength or weakness of the high school's curriculum, in-state residency,
alumni relationships, personal essay, and personal achievement or
leadership. 33
The predominant factor was high school GPA, which contributed up to
eighty points. 34 There were a total of 110 points available for academic
factors.35 In addition, up to forty points could be awarded for non-academic
25. Id. at 254 n.7.
26. Id. A student who was waitlisted would receive a letter stating that although the ap-
plicant was in the qualified range, he or she would not be immediately admitted. Id. at 256. The
applicant would then be placed on a waiting list. Id. If students who had been admitted declined
their admission, persons from the waiting list could then be admitted. Id. However, if enough
spots did not open up to allow admission, the applicant would subsequently be denied. Id.
27. Id. at 255.







34. Brief for Respondents at 7, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
35. Id. The applicant's SAT or ACT score could total up to twelve points. Id. Applicants
could receive up to ten points for the academic strength of their high school (for example,
counselors evaluate the student's curriculum based on their knowledge of labels such as
"honors"). Id. at 8. Counselors could also subtract up to four points from those who chose
weaker class schedules when more difficult classes were available. Id.
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factors. 36 The most controversial of these factors included the awarding of
twenty points for one of the following: socioeconomic disadvantage, mem-
bership in an underrepresented minority group, attendance at a predomi-
nantly minority or predominantly socio-economically disadvantaged high
school, recruitment for athletics, or at the Provost's discretion. 37  The
University claimed that the new "selection index" did not change the way
race was substantively considered in admissions; it only changed the
mechanics. 38
From 1995 to 1998, the University's policy also provided that qualified
applicants from underrepresented minorities should be admitted as soon as
possible. 39 To achieve this goal, the University maintained a rolling ad-
missions policy to permit consideration of these applications submitted later
in the academic year through the use of "'protected seats."' 40 A committee
projected the likely number of applications, and a corresponding number of
seats were held until these groups had been accommodated.4 1 Any re-
maining seats would then be released to the general applicant pool. 42
In 1999 and 2000, the OUA decided to provide an additional level of
review for some applicants, while still awarding twenty points to all mi-
nority applicants.4 3 Under the new system, a counselor could "flag" an
applicant for review by the Admissions Review Committee (ARC) if the
applicant "(1) [was] academically prepared to succeed at the university, (2)
[had] achieved a minimum selection index score, and (3) possess[ed] a
quality or characteristic important to the University's composition of its
freshman class, such as high class rank, unique life experiences, challenges,
circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and
36. Id. Applicants were given up to ten points more if they were Michigan residents, six
more points for being from an underrepresented county, two points for residency in under-
represented states, four points if one of the applicant's parents was an alumnus, one point if a
sibling or grandparent was an alumnus, three points for an excellent personal essay, five points for
personal achievement, and five points for leadership. Id. at 8-9.
37. Id. at 9. According to University Provost Paul Courant, "provost's discretion" was a way
of giving further consideration to children of university donors. Victoria Edwards & Tomislav
Ladika, U. Michigan: U. Michigan Students Question Points for Legacies, Donors, U-WRE, Mar.
13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 16409660. Courant stated that the children of donors are not
guaranteed points but they can be awarded twenty points at the provost's discretion. Id. The use
of this discretion has diminished in the last three years, according to Courant. Id.
38. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003).
39. Id. at 256. This was because the University believed that minorities would be more
likely to decline admission if forced to wait. Id.







underrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography." 44 The ARC then deter-
mined whether to admit, defer, or deny each applicant.45
In October of 1997, petitioners filed a class action lawsuit against the
University of Michigan, the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts,
James Duderstadt and Lee Bollinger.46  Petitioners asserted that the
University had violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by using
race as a factor for admissions. 47 Petitioners sought injunctive, declaratory,
and monetary relief in an amount to be proven at trial.48
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to
liability.49 The district court upheld the University's admissions policy
after 1998, finding diversity to be a compelling state interest.5 0 However,
the district court found the admissions policy from 1995 to 1998 "to be
more problematic."51 The court held that the University's practice of "pro-
tecting seats" for underrepresented minorities kept others from competing
for these spots. 5 2 This system was found to be "a functional equivalent of a
quota."5 3 Thus, the district court granted the petitioners' motion for
summary judgment for the years of 1995 to 1998, but granted the
respondents' summary judgment for the 1999 to 2000 policy. 54 Therefore,
44. Id. at 256-57. Michigan residents needed a score of eighty while out-of-state applicants
needed a seventy-five to be considered for the flagging procedure. Id. at 257 n.8.
45. Id. at 257.
46. Id. at 252. The Board of Regents was subsequently named the proper defendant
replacing the University and the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. Id. at 252 n.2.
Duderstadt was the president of the University when Gratz applied. Id. at 252 n.3. He was sued
in his individual capacity. Id. Bollinger was president when Hamacher applied and was sued both
in his official capacity and as an individual. Id.
47. Id. at 252. Title VI explains that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (2000). Section 1981(a) provides that: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts... and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). The Equal Protection Clause re-
quires that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Complaint at para. 1, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-
75231), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legallgratz/gratzham.html. The dis-
trict court also agreed to bifurcate determination of liability and damages. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122
F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The liability phase of the trial was to proceed first with
damages being assessed separately. Id.
49. Id. at 815.
50. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 258-59 (2003).
51. Id. at 259.
52. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 833.
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the court denied the petitioners' request for injunctive relief.55 Both parties
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals because neither side had
achieved a total victory. 56 The Sixth Circuit heard the appeal on the same
day as Grutter v. Bollinger,57 a companion case challenging the Uni-
versity's Law School admissions policy. 58 The Sixth Circuit upheld the
admissions policy for the University of Michigan's Law School in
Grutter.59
Fearing a similar result in their own case, petitioners Gratz and
Hamacher applied for and were granted certiorari from the Supreme Court
before the Sixth Circuit could announce a decision.60 On June 23, 2003, the
United States Supreme Court held that (1) petitioners had standing to seek
declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) the university's current undergraduate
admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because its use of
race was not narrowly tailored to achieve the University's asserted
compelling interest in diversity; and (3) Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 were
also violated by the admissions policy. 6'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
55. Id. at 814.
56. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 259 (2003). Gratz and Hamacher sought to overturn
the lower court's decision that diversity was a compelling interest. Id. The University appealed
because its policies after 1998 were found to be unconstitutional. Id.
57. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Grutter involved a challenge to
the University of Michigan's Law School admissions policy by rejected white applicants. Id. at
735. At the district court level, the policy was struck down because diversity was not found to be
a compelling interest and the law schools use of race in admissions was not narrowly tailored.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding diversity to be a compelling interest and the program to be narrowly tailored. Grutter, 288
F.3d at 735.
58. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259.
59. Id. In Grutter, the Sixth Circuit looked to Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978), to determine whether the law school had a compelling interest in promoting
diversity of the student body. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 738. The majority of the court found that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding on the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 739. This meant that
the law school could use a policy to promote racial diversity if it was not overly broad. Id. The
Sixth Circuit then examined whether the law school's admissions policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest of diversity. Id. at 744. The Court noted that the law school's
plan was virtually the same as a similar plan approved by Justice Powell in Bakke. Id. at 747. It
was a single-track plan with no separate admissions process for minority applicants. Id. at 746.
Additionally, the plan considered more than just race in its definition of diversity. Id. at 747. The
plan also considered factors such as the applicant's leadership, work experience, unique talents or
interests, and letters of recommendation. Id. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the plan was constitutional under Bakke. Id. at 752.
60. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259-60.
61. Id. at 245-47.
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protection of the laws." 62 This amendment has never been held to deny the
government the ability to treat people differently because of a certain char-
acteristic. 63 Most classifications drawn by the government only need to
pass a rational basis test.64 However, racial classifications require the
highest scrutiny.65
A. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS REQUIRE STRICT SCRUTINY
In Korematsu v. United States,66 the United States Supreme Court held
"that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect." 67 That is not to say that all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional, rather the courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny. 68 Since Korematsu, the Court has consistently applied strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications. 69 This standard does not change wheth-
er the particular racial classification benefits or burdens the party. 70 This
failure to distinguish between benevolent and invidious discrimination
based on race has caused consistent dissent. 7'
When a governmental unit makes a race-based classification, that
classification will be found constitutional only if it is a narrowly tailored
measure that is designed to further one or more compelling governmental
interests.72 For a classification to be narrowly tailored it must be "neces-
sary" to further the compelling interest.73 The fit between the law and the
compelling interest must be "the most exact connection." 74 Affirmative
action has been strictly scrutinized, along with all racial classifications. 75
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. E.g. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (stating that states may dis-
criminate on basis of age if there is a rational basis for doing so).
64. Id.
65. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
66. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
67. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
68. Id.
69. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
70. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion).
71. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316-17 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there is a clear difference between racial inclusion and exclusion);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 358-59 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that where a policy is not designed to stigmatize minorities, but rather to help
them, it should be constitutional. Id. at 379.
72. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
73. Id. at 237.
74. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
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B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action has been defined as a voluntary undertaking to
remedy discrimination by means of specific group-based preferences or
numerical goals that are accompanied by a specified time period for achiev-
ing those goals.76 State, local, and federal governments have implemented
programs that are designed to remedy the past effects of discrimination. 77
1. The Struggle to Find Compelling Interests
Governments have offered many interests to justify their actions. 78
Diversity of a student body and remedying the effects of past discrimination
are the only interests to be marginally successful. 79 In Smith v. University
of Washington Law School,80 the Ninth Circuit held diversity of the student
body was a compelling interest. 81 Similarly, the Supreme Court held in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company82 that a city's interest in cor-
recting past discrimination can be compelling when backed by particular
findings in that jurisdiction.83
a. Is Diversity Compelling?
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,84 the Court ad-
dressed a race-based admissions policy for the first time.85 In Bakke, the
University of California at Davis Medical School maintained a dual track
admissions policy. 86 This policy was designed to increase the number of
"disadvantaged" students admitted to each class.87 The admissions policy
76. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 170 (1st Cir. 1996).
77. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205; Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
78. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06.
79. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); Croson, 488 U.S. at
469.
80. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
81. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01.
82. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
83. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
84. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
86. Id. at 272-73.
87. Id. at 272. Applicants were asked whether they considered themselves to be
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged." Id. at 274. The applicants were also asked
whether they wished to be considered as a member of a "minority group." Id. The students who
responded affirmatively to these questions were evaluated by a special committee. Id. These
applicants did not have to meet the minimum GPA standard of 2.5 or compete against the other
mainstream applicants. Id. at 275. Although many whites considered themselves "disadvan-
taged," none received admission through the special committee. Id. at 276.
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reserved sixteen out of one hundred spots for "disadvantaged" students.
88
Alan Bakke, a white male, filed suit after twice being denied admission,
even though minority students with lower scores were granted admission.
89
Justice Powell, writing for himself, applied strict scrutiny to the
school's admissions policy. 90 The medical school responded with a list of
potential compelling interests. 91 Justice Powell argued that diversity of the
student body was compelling.92 Justice Powell based this decision largely
on the importance of academic freedom and its First Amendment pro-
tection.93 He argued that since diversity was an essential part of academic
freedom, it should be protected under the First Amendment. 94 However,
this conclusion was once again unsupported by the other justices.
95
Justice Brennan, writing for four justices, joined Justice Powell in
finding that the "Government may take race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group... ."96 However, this was only appro-
priate to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 97  Justice
Brennan agreed that the Harvard Plan backed by Justice Powell was
constitutional, so long as the use of race was limited to remedying the
lingering effects of past discrimination.
98
88. Id. at 275.
89. Id. at 276-78.
90. Id. at 305. Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny to the racial classification in Part IV of
his opinion. Id. No other justices joined in this part. Id. at 272.
91. Id. at 306. The medical school argued that (a) reducing the historic deficit of tra-
ditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession, (b) countering
the effects of societal discrimination, (c) increasing the number of doctors in underserved com-
munities, and (d) obtaining the educational benefits derived from a racially diverse student body
were compelling interests. Id.
92. Id. at 311-15. However, Justice Powell found that the policy was not narrowly tailored,
because the quota system was not "necessary" to achieve diversity. Id. at 315. Additionally,
Justice Powell found that the medical school's sole focus on ethnic diversity undermined other
important forms of diversity. Id. Justice Powell recommended a program similar to Harvard
College's. Id. at 316. The Justice's plan would focus on all forms of diversity, because "[a] farm
boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer." Id.
Under this system, race could be used as a "plus" in one applicant's file while not completely
insulating him or her from competition with fellow applicants. Id. at 317. In effect, each appli-
cant would be treated as an individual in the admissions process. Id. at 318. Justice Powell rea-
soned that if many forms of diversity were included, a rejected applicant could not blame his
rejection solely on his race or ethnic background. Id. Therefore, Justice Powell found that "the
denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is the
principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program." Id. at 318 n.52.
93. Id. at 312.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., plurality) (joining in Parts I, II, V-C); see id. at 411 (Stevens, J.,
plurality) (arguing that the question of whether race should be considered in admissions was not
an issue in the case and any discussion of it would be inappropriate).
96. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., plurality).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 326 n. 1.
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Meanwhile, Justice Stevens, writing for four justices, agreed only with
Justice Powell that the exclusion of Bakke because of his race violated Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act.99 He argued that when a court can make a ruling
on statutory grounds, avoiding-a constitutional issue, it must do so. 100
Following the fractured opinion in Bakke, the circuits have disagreed as
to whether diversity of a student body was a compelling interest.10 The
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have found diversity to be compelling.102 Yet, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have rejected diversity as a compelling in-
terest. 03 In addition to educational diversity, governments have tried to
justify racial classifications as a way of remedying past discrimination.1 04
b. Remedying Past Discrimination
Courts have long been concerned with remedying the past effects of
racial discrimination.105 In United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education,106 a school desegregation case, the Fifth Circuit stated that "an
appropriate remedy should undo the results of past discrimination as well as
prevent future inequality of treatment." 07
The Supreme Court stated in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.108 that this
rationale could be used in the right situation. 109 In Croson, the City of
Richmond developed a program for Minority Business Enterprises
(MBE's).110 The program reserved thirty percent of all city construction
contracts for MBE's.I An MBE was defined as a business where at least
fifty-one percent of the stock was owned by an African-American,
99. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., plurality).
100. Id. at 411.
101. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
diversity is a compelling interest); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding diversity is a compelling interest), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); contra Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding diversity is not a compelling interest); Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (holding diversity is a not a
compelling interest).
102. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01; Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739.
103. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944; Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1247.
104. E.g. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
105. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
106. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. Jefferson, 372 F.2d at 877 (quoting United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 768 (5th Cir.
1964)).
108. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
109. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.




Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Eskimo, or an Aleutian person. 1 2 The
plan was adopted to remedy past discrimination in Richmond's construction
industry.I"3 This was done even though there was no direct evidence of
past discrimination, either by Richmond's contractors or by the city when a-
warding the bids.1"4 The Court applied strict scrutiny because it was a
racial classification.'l 5 Due to the lack of evidence of past discrimination
within the city or by the city, the program was struck down."l 6 However,
the Court stated, "[niothing we say today precludes a state or local entity
from taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within
its jurisdiction." 117
Governments can remedy both the effects of systematic and individual
discrimination.118 The Court reasoned that a narrowly tailored racial pre-
ference could be used in extreme cases.119 Thus, remedying past dis-
crimination could have been a compelling interest, if it was backed by
direct evidence and was used in an "extreme case" where other alternatives
were not available. 20 In addition to presenting a compelling interest, a
racial classification must be narrowly tailored to the advancement of that
interest.1 21
2. Racial Classifications Must be Narrowly Tailored
Once the government has a compelling interest, it must demonstrate
that the racial classification has been narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.122 This requires that the racial classification is "necessary" to fur-
ther the compelling interest. 123 Thus, a racial classification should only be
used in "extreme cases" or where no race-neutral alternatives exist.124
In United States v. Paradise,125 the Court listed several factors to be
used to determine whether a racial classification was narrowly tailored.1
26
112. Id. at 478. Please note that these terms have been changed to more acceptable modem
race designations.
113. Id. at 480.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 493.
116. Id. at 510-11.
117. Id. at 509.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 509-11.
121. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 237.
124. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989) (arguing that safeguards
are needed to prevent those with political power from favoring their own racial groups).
125. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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These factors include (1) the efficacy of race neutral alternatives; (2) the
planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between the numerical
goal and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant popu-lation; (4) the flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers ifthe goal cannot be met; and (5) the burden of the policy on third parties.127
If viable race-neutral alternatives existed, the racial classification was
not "necessary."128 The planned duration of the program had to be limited
and could "not last longer than the discriminatory effects it [was] designed
to eliminate."129 Next, a policy cannot look to a group's prevalence in thepopulation and automatically reserve the same percentage of places in agiven profession.130 The policy must be flexible, treating all members of
the favored group as individuals, rather than mechanically assigning bene-fits simply based on race or ethnicity.131 Finally, a policy cannot give abenefit to the favored group that would "unduly disadvantage" the dis-favored group.1 32 Opponents and proponents of affirmative action have
looked for race neutral alternatives.133
C. PERCENTAGE PLANS: A RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE TO
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
In recent years, affirmative action has been under siege. 134 Opponents
have successfully removed it through the ballot box, in the courtroom, andby executive order.135 In California and Washington, voters have passedinitiatives banning the use of affirmative action in public education. 136 TheFifth and Eleventh Circuits declared the affirmative action policies of the
126. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481(1986)).
127. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hayesv. N. State Law Enforcement Officer Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 1993)).
128. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-09. The Court found that the city failed to even consider anyrace-neutral alternatives, and thus the policy was not narrowly tailored. Id.
129. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980).
130. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 494).131. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga,, 263 F.3d 1234, 1253 (1 lth Cir. 2001).Racial quotas are forbidden. Id. Additionally, a race-conscious admissions policy must not beapplied in such a "rigid or mechanical" way as to make race the defining characteristic instead oftreating all applicants as individuals. Id. at 1253-54. As a result, the University of Georgia'sadmissions policy was found to be too mechanical and therefore not narrowly tailored. Id. at
1254.
132. Id.






University of Texas Law School and University of Georgia uncon-
stitutional.137 In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush issued an executive order
banning the use of affirmative action in admissions.1
38 Following these
defeats, universities searched for a viable alternative.t
39
Fearing a large decline in minority enrollment, officials in California,
Texas, and Florida instituted percentage plans that guaranteed admission to
students who met the state's class rank requirement.'
4° For example, Cali-
fornia's Board of Regents adopted a plan to admit all students who
graduated within the top four percent of their high school class.
141. The new
plan had mixed results.142 In 2002, more minorities were admitted to the
state's university system than under the old affirmative 
action plan. 43
However, opponents were quick to point out that the number of minority
students actually declined at the most prestigious schools. 
144
Unlike state courts, federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.1 45
They possess only the power that is authorized by the Constitution and by
statute. 146 It is presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction,
and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.147 To fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the party
bringing the claim must have standing.
48
D. STANDING
To have standing, a party must allege a present case and controversy.1
49
Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case 
or
137. Id. at 589 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001)).
138. Id. at 604 (citing Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 
1999), available at
http://www.state.fl.us/eog/executiveorders/1999/november/eo99-
2 8 1"html (last visited Feb. 1,
2004)).
139. Id. at 588.
140. Id. at 606.
141. Id. This new plan was designed to combat the loss of minority 
students following the
adoption of Proposition 209. Id.
142. Id. at 608.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 608-09. Similarly, at the University of Florida, that 
state's most elite public
university, African-American student enrollment declined from twelve 
percent to six or seven
percent the year following the elimination of the affirmative action policy. 
Id. at 610.
145. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 
(1994).
146. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992).
147. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7, 8 (1799); 
McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936).
148. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 94-
101 (1968)).
149. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:289
controversy regarding injunctive relief.150 For a present case or controversy
to exist, there must be present adverse effects resulting from the earlier
exposure to illegal conduct. 151
The Court has stated that "the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to hat e the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues."152 Standing focuses on the individual bringing the com-
plaint rather than on the issues he or she wishes to have adjudicated. 153
According to the modem Court, standing has three elements.154 "First,
the plaintiff must have suffered 'an injury in fact."1 55 This injury must
have been to a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and par-
ticularized, and (b) actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 156
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury suffered and
the defendant's actions. 157 Third, it must be likely that relief will result
from a favorable decision for the plaintiff.158 The Court explained that
"particularized" meant that injury must affect the person in a "personal and
individual way."159  The plaintiff has the burden to prove all three
elements. 160
To determine whether a plaintiff has standing, the Court may look
beyond overt actions to the intent of the parties.'61 In Clements v.
Fashing,162 the Court considered a challenge to a provision of the Texas
Constitution that required the immediate resignation of all state officials
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
153. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99.
154. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
155. Id. at 560. The plaintiff himself must suffer the injury. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 999 (1982). It is not enough that someone else might be injured by the conduct of which the
plaintiff complains. Id. The plaintiff must show that he is among the class that is affected by the
defendant's actions. Id. Additionally, a plaintiff who has suffered an injury of one kind cannot
litigate a claim based on a similar injury by which he or she has not been personally been affected.
Id. In Blum, the Court held that where class representatives had only been threatened with
transfers to lower levels of care they did not have standing to represent those that had been
threatened with higher levels of care. Id. at 1001. "If the right to complain of one administrative
deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any
citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring before the whole structure of state administration
before the courts for review." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1995).
156. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).
157. Id. at 561 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
158. Id. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-58 (holding that
parents lacked standing where tax suit against IRS was unlikely to force private schools to
desegregate).
159. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
160. Id. at 561.
161. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
162. 457 U.S. 957, 962 (1982).
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upon their announcement to run for another office. 163 The Court found that
they had met Article III standing because they would have announced their
candidacy for other offices but for the automatic resignation provision. 1
64
In a class action lawsuit, a plaintiff must meet the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) to have standing.165  The main
requirement, in terms of standing, is that claims and defenses of the repre-
sentative party be typical of the claims and defenses of the absent class
members. 66 Therefore, in H.L. v. Matheson,167 an unemancipated minor
had no standing to litigate claims on behalf of emancipated older women. 168
Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 169 Medicaid patients transferred to lower
levels of care lacked standing to litigate on behalf of patients objecting to
transfers to more intensive care facilities. 7
0
Finally, the Court has found that actual performance is not required to
confer Article III standing. 71 In affirmative action cases, a plaintiff only
needs to be able to show the inability to compete on an equal footing to
claim an actual injury.172 To establish standing, a party must be able to
show that they were ready and able to perform, but for the policy.1
73
III. ANALYSIS
In Gratz v. Bollinger,174 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion of the Court, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas joined. 175 The majority held that (1) the petitioners had standing to
163. Clements, 457 U.S. at 962.
164. Id.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action provides that:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
166. Id.
167. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
168. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 406-07.
169. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
170. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1001.
171. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361-62 n.23 (1970) (holding that a plaintiff, who
did not own property, had standing to challenge a law requiring property ownership for member-
ship on the school board, even though he did not present any evidence showing that he applied
and was rejected).
172. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
173. Id.
174. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
175. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247.
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seek declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief; (2) the University's ad-
missions program was not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted com-
pelling interest in diversity; and (3) the policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause, so it also violated Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.176 Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined in
part.17 7 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.178 Justice Breyer also
concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion. 179 Justice Stevens dis-
sented in an opinion in which Justice Souter joined.180 Justice Souter filed a
separate dissent in which Justice Ginsburg joined in part.1Sl Justice Gins-
burg also filed a separate dissent in which Justice Breyer joined in part.1 82
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court was presented with a challenge to the University of Michi-
gan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts admissions policy. 183
The Court found that the petitioners had standing because they had a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the case.1 84 Next, the Court held the admis-
sions policy unconstitutional, because it was not narrowly tailored for
achieving educational diversity. 185 Finally, the Court held that the policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.186
1. Standing
Even though neither party raised the issue of standing, the Court
examined whether petitioner Hamacher had standing to seek declaratory
and injunctive relief.187 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Hamacher's
future injury was not hypothetical, even though Hamacher did not actually
apply for admission as a transfer student.18 8 The Chief Justice noted that if
Hamacher was required to apply and be rejected, the cycle would continue
176. Id. at 245-47.
177. Id. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 291 (Souter, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 249-50.
184. Id. at 268.
185. Id. at 275.
186. Id. at 275-76.
187. Id. at 260.
188. Id. at 260-61.
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indefinitely, because Hamacher would always be required to show that he
intended to transfer again.189
The majority relied on a line of precedent showing that intent had been
used to establish standing in numerous previous equal protection cases. 190
Justice Rehnquist noted that Hamacher did intend to transfer, even though
he did not actually apply to transfer after his initial rejection.'91 Therefore,
the Chief Justice determined that Hamacher had the necessary intent re-
quired to allege actual injury. 192
Next, the Court reasoned that for injury to exist, Hamacher only needed
to show an inability to compete on equal footing with other applicants.1
93
Justice Rehnquist concluded that to establish standing, a party challenging a
set-aside program only needs to demonstrate that it was ready and able to
perform, but for the discriminatory policy. 194
The Court noted that Hamacher's claim was that race prevented him
from competing equally for admission with minority applicants. 95 The ma-
jority determined that a minority with the same qualifications as Hamacher
would have been admitted.X9 6 The Court reasoned that after being denied
admission, Hamacher demonstrated that he was "able and ready" to apply
as a transfer student if the University dropped its admissions policy.
97
Therefore, Hamacher was deemed to have standing to challenge the Uni-
versity's use of race in admissions. 98
Next, the Court rejected the notion that Hamacher was not properly
certified as a class representative to seek injunctive relief.' 99 Chief Justice
189. Id. at 261.
190. Id. at 261-62 (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962 (1982)).
191. Id. at 262.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
194. Id. (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter, 508 U.S. at 666).
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 115a, Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1044
(2002) (No. 02-516)). 0
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 268. The petitioners filed a class action lawsuit and the district court certified
both as class representatives. Id. at 252. The class contained those who applied and were rejected
under both the freshman and transfer admissions policies. Id. at 252-53. Justice Stevens argued
that differences between the freshman and transfer admissions policies prevented Hamacher from
representing freshmen applicants. Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Most notably Stevens noted
that the transfer policy did not use the 150-point system. Id. Instead the transfer policy provided
that some applicants, including minority and socially disadvantaged applicants would generally be
admitted if they possessed a 2.5 undergraduate GPA, sophomore standing, and a 3.0 high school
GPA. Id. Justice Stevens argued that these differences denied Hamacher standing as a class
representative, because his injury was not the same as the absent class members. Id. at 286-87.
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Rehnquist determined that Hamacher had standing, because his claim con-
cerned the same fundamental issue as the absent class members. 200 Justice
Rehnquist noted that the University used the same criteria to evaluate
transfer and freshmen applicants. 201 The Chief Justice found that the only
difference between the criteria was that all underrepresented, minority,
freshmen applicants received the twenty points and were admitted, while
virtually all underrepresented, minority transfers were admitted. 202 The
Court found that while this small difference may be relevant in a narrow
tailoring argument, it was not relevant to Hamacher's standing.203
Furthermore, the majority relied on precedent to show that where a
class member and his or her representative have been judged by the same
test, the requirements of rule 23(a) would clearly be satisfied.204 The Chief
Justice noted that the same issues were implicated by the use of race in all
undergraduate admissions under the policy.205
The Court found the district court's certification of the lawsuit valid as
a class action because it was a perfect vehicle for ensuring that an indi-
vidual's claim does not become moot.2 06 The majority held that Hamacher
had standing because his past injury and the risk of future injury at the time
of certification demonstrated the need for a class action.2 07 Having shown
that petitioners had standing, Justice Rehnquist turned to the merits of the
case. 208
2. Diversity Found to be Compelling
Because the University used a racial classification, the Court applied
strict scrutiny. 209 The Chief Justice noted that the standard does not change
whether the minority is benefited or burdened. 210 The Court held that in
order to survive strict scrutiny, a racial classification must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 211
200. Id. at 267-68.
201. Id. at 265.
202. Id. at 266
203. Id.
204. Id. at 267 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n. 15 (1982)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 267-68 (citing Joint Appendix at 67-69, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516)).
207. Id. at 268.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 270.
210. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
211. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
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The majority rejected the petitioner's argument that the Court had
never found diversity to be a compelling interest, and that only the desire to
remedy past discrimination was compelling. 212 The Court rejected the con-
tention that "'diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply
too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling
interest capable of supporting a narrowly-tailored means."'
213
The majority held that diversity of the student body was a compelling
interest. 214 Since educational diversity in higher education was a com-
pelling interest, the Chief Justice next examined whether the University's
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
215
3. The Policy Was Not Narrowly Tailored
The majority found that the admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored, because it automatically distributed twenty points, one fifth of the
points needed for admission, to every minority student.216  Justice
Rehnquist relied on Bakke to conclude that a proper system would consider
race or ethnicity to be a "'plus."' 2 17 A "plus" meant that a particular black
applicant could be compared with an Italian-American who exhibits quali-
ties that promote diversity, without race being the decisive factor.218 The
Chief Justice summarized that such a system would be flexible enough to
ensure that all applicants are treated as individuals. 219
The majority noted that Justice Powell had underscored the importance
of this individual treatment.220 The Chief Justice explained that Justice
Powell never contemplated that race would become the all-important single
characteristic automatically guaranteeing the admittance of minority appli-
cants. 221 Justice Rehnquist stressed that Justice Powell intended that all of
an individual's traits should be considered during the admissions process.222
The Court found the University's policy strayed too far from this
intent.223 The majority held that the policy mechanically awarded every
212. Id. at 268 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516)).
213. Id. (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 17-18, 40-41, Gratz (No. 02-516)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 270.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 270-71 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
218. Id. at 271 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
219. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
220. Id.
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minority applicant twenty points toward admission with only a determina-
tion that the applicant was, indeed, a minority. 224 The University made race
the decisive factor by automatically awarding twenty points to all
minorities.225
Next, the Court considered Justice Powell's hypothetical example of
how the Harvard Plan would treat applicants as individuals. 226 The
example was as follows:
"The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill,
might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a
successful black physician in an academic community with
promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who
grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose
academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated
energy and leadership as well as an apparent abiding interest in
black power. If a good number of black students much like A but
few like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer
B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique
quality might give him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the
critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not
dependant upon race but sometimes associated with it."227
Justice Rehnquist rejected the notion that the University followed the
Harvard Plan. 228 The Chief Justice demonstrated how both students A and
B were automatically given twenty points, even though their backgrounds
were completely different.229 However, the third, a white student who was
an extremely talented artist, could only receive a maximum of five
points. 230 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that under the Harvard Plan,
applicant C would likely receive equal consideration because of his extra-
ordinary talent.231
The Chief Justice next attacked the University's claim that the new
flagging procedure implemented in 1999 addressed the problem. 232 The
224. Id. at 271-72.
225. Id. at 272.
226. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324).
227. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324) (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 273 n.20.
229. Id. at 273.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. The University claimed that the additional procedure of flagging allowed counselors
to look at applications individually. Id. This procedure allowed additional consideration for ap-
plicants that were qualified but had not already been admitted. Id. at 256-57.
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Court again used Justice Powell's A, B, and C example from Bakke.233
Justice Rehnquist concluded that student A would never be flagged; instead,
he would automatically receive twenty points for being an "under-
represented minority," which would ensure that he would be admitted.
234
Therefore, the University would never consider A's individual experiences
or his potential contribution to diversity.235 Students B and C could be
flagged, assuming that B was not already admitted by virtue of being a-
warded twenty points automatically and C could muster seventy points.236
The Chief Justice noted that only a small number of applicants were ever
flagged. 237 However, this was always after the twenty points had already
been awarded.
238
Next, the Court rejected the University's claim that an individualized
application process would not be possible because of the large number of
applications received. 239 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that potential ad-
ministrative challenges resulting from the implementation of a program
capable of presenting an individualized assessment of each applicant would
not excuse the use of an otherwise unconstitutional alternative. 240
The Court determined that because the policy was not narrowly
tailored, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 24 1 The Court also found that the policy violated Title VI and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.242
233. Id. at 273.
234. Id. at 273-74
235. Id. at 274.
236. Id.
237. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 117a, Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S.
1044 (2002) (No. 02-516)). The majority found the flagging procedure to be too little too late. Id.
Too few applicants were flagged to provide any real individualized scrutiny for applicants. Id.
Additionally, the Court noted that the University never even provided the actual number of
applications flagged. Id.
238. Id. The majority opined that this feature only reinforced the flaws of the policy. Id. at
273. The Court noted that the automatic award of twenty points to all minorities virtually assured
them of automatic admission. Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned that very few minorities were
ever evaluated as individuals. Id. at 273-74.
239. Id. at 275 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 6 n.8, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516)).
240. Id. at 275-76 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989)).
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001)). The Court ruled that a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause by an institution that accepts federal funds also violates
Title VI. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). Section 1981 was meant to proscribe
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts against, or in favor, of any race.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1985). A contract for educational
services is a "contract" under § 1981. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976). Finally, a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause by purposeful discrimination will also violate § 1981.
Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-390 (1982).
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B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion to emphasize the differ-
ences between the University's law school admission policy, which was
upheld in Grutter, and the admission policy in this case, which was uncon-
stitutional. 243 Justice O'Connor concluded that the lack of individualized
review was fatal to the program.244
After summarizing the lower court's decision and the admissions
policy, Justice O'Connor explained that the University's policy actually
prevented individualized evaluation of the applicants. 245 She argued that by
granting twenty points to all minority applicants and only five points to
even the most outstanding white leader, the University had ensured that
each individual's contribution to diversity could not be individually as-
sessed. 246 Justice O'Connor concluded that race had become the deciding
and dominant factor, overwhelming most of the other nonracial factors. 247
Finally, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the University's contention
that the flagging process provided an individualized assessment of
applicants. 248 She saw this process as little more than an "afterthought." 249
She argued that there was very little evidence presented at trial to show how
many applicants were actually evaluated by this process or if the flagging
process even worked. 250 In addition, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
cutoff level for review was only enforced after all the minority applicants
had already received their automatic twenty points.251 Subsequently,
Justice O'Connor concluded that there was not enough evidence to support
a finding of individualized review required by strict scrutiny. 252 Thus, she
joined the Court's opinion reversing the district court.253
243. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-77 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
University of Michigan Law School also had a race-conscious admissions policy. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). However, students were given individualized reviews with
racial or ethnic diversity being a factor. Id. at 337. The Law School considered many possible
non-racial factors in achieving diversity. Id. at 338. The Law School also frequently accepted
non-minority applicants with lower test scores based on these factors. Id.
244. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277.
245. Id. at 279.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 279-80.







C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas concurred because he agreed that the Court properly
applied precedent, including Grutter v. Bollinger.254 In Grutter, Justice
Thomas wrote a separate opinion dissenting from the overall result, but
concurring with the majority for two reasons. 255 First, Justice Thomas
agreed with the majority that the use of race in admissions remained un-
lawful. 256 Second, he approved of the majority's conclusion that the use of
racial preferences in higher education will be illegal within twenty-five
years. 257 For similar reasons to his opinion in that case, Justice Thomas
would have held that the Equal Protection Clause categorically denied the
state's use of racial preferences in admissions. 258
Justice Thomas wrote separately to acknowledge that this policy
avoided the added constitutional defect of discriminating among the
preferred racial groups. 259 He argued that the policy avoided this problem
because it awarded all minorities the same racial preference.
260
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas found the policy was unconstitutional,
"because it [did] not sufficiently allow for the consideration of nonracial
distinctions among underrepresented minority applicants." 261 He elaborated
that a valid policy would have to allow consideration of nonracial dis-
tinctions of all applicants.262
D. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
In his one paragraph opinion, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment,
but not in the Court's opinion.263  Therefore, he joined in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence except when she joined the Court's opinion.
264
Justice Breyer also joined in Part I of Justice Ginsburg's dissent, because he
agreed with her that government policymakers should "distinguish between
policies of inclusion and exclusion," as those of inclusion are more con-
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
265
254. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
255. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-51 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring and part and
dissenting in part).
256. Id. at 350-351.
257. Id. at 351.





263. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 281-82.
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E. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, asserted that the petitioners
lacked standing to seek forward-looking relief.266 Unlike the plaintiff in
Grutter, petitioners Hamacher and Gratz both enrolled and were accepted
into other schools before they filed their complaint.267 Additionally, neither
petitioner had been in the process of reapplying, nor had tried since.268
Justice Stevens concluded that "[t]here [was] a total absence of evidence
that either petitioner would receive any benefit from the prospective relief
sought by their lawyer." 269 Justice Stevens noted that even though some
unidentified person may have standing to seek injunctive relief, neither
petitioner did.270
Justice Stevens admitted that both Gratz and Hamacher had standing to
seek damages, as compensation for an alleged wrongful denial of admis-
sion.271 However, relying on Los Angeles v. Lyons,272 Justice Stevens noted
that past injuries do not allow a party to protect third parties from similar
harm. 273 He argued that in order to seek injunctive relief, petitioners must
show that they faced an imminent threat of future injury.274 Justice Stevens
reasoned that in this case, neither petitioner faced any threat of future injury
based on the University's admissions policy, because they both had already
enrolled in different schools at the time the case was filed.275
Justice Stevens argued that Hamacher did not have standing for three
reasons. 276 First, Hamacher presented no evidence to show that he ever
actually applied for admission as a transfer student.277 Therefore, Justice
Stevens argued that Hamacher's threat of future injury was "conjectural or
hypothetical" rather than "real or immediate." 278
266. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Id. Justice Stevens noted that Barbara Grutter had not attended another law school and
that she still desired to go to the University's law school. Id. at 282 n. 1 (citing Joint Appendix at
30, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
268. Id. at 282.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 284.
272. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
273. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 284 (2003) (citing Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 102).
274. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1995)).
275. Id. at 284 n.4.
276. Id. at 285.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 285-86 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
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Second, the transfer policy was neither before the Court, nor was it
even addressed by the district court. 279 Justice Stevens noted that signifi-
cant differences between the two policies existed.280 As a result, Hamacher
should not be permitted to complain about the freshman application
process. 28' Justice Stevens declared, "For '[i]f the right to complain of one
administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of
all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could
bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for
review.' 28
2
Third, Justice Stevens noted that relief must be likely to flow from a
favorable decision. 283 He argued that the differences between the transfer
and freshmen policies would make it unlikely that an injunction granted to
modify the freshmen policy would have any effect on the transfer policy.
284
Justice Stevens concluded that Hamacher could not have standing to seek
injunctive relief because he would never obtain relief.
285
Next, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's contention that
Hamacher had standing because he challenged every use of race in admis-
sions by the University. 286 Justice Stevens relied on both the transcript of
oral arguments287 and the brief by petitioners 288 to show that the petitioners
did not challenge all use of race, but only the use of diversity as a
compelling interest in undergraduate admissions.
289
Justice Stevens argued that because the transfer policy was not before
the Court, it was impossible to know whether the University would defend
it based on diversity grounds or under a remedial interest context. 290 He
279. Id. at 286 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516)).
280. Id. Mainly, the transfer admissions policy did not use a point system where twenty
points were automatically given to minority applicants. Id. (citing 10 Record at 16 (Ex. C), Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516)).
281. Id.
282. id. at 286-87 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358-59 n.6 (1996)).
283. Id. at 287 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
284. Id. at 287 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 287-88 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003) (No. 02-516)). Petitioners' attorney admitted that they were not suggesting an abso-
lute ban on using race in admissions. Id.
288. Id. at 288 (citing Brief of Petitioners at 16-17, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516)). Justice Stevens noted that "petitioners' briefs filed with this Court attack the
University's asserted interest in 'diversity,' but acknowledge that race could be considered for
remedial reasons." Id.
289. Id. at 287-88.
290. Id.
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also noted that the transfer policy's absence of a point system might affect a
narrow tailoring analysis of the policy.29'
Justice Stevens likened Hamacher's claim to that of an unemancipated
minor who lacked standing to litigate on behalf of older women, and to that
of Medicaid patients transferred to intensive care that lacked standing to
litigate on behalf of those who faced a transfer to more intensive care. 292
Like those plaintiffs, Justice Stevens argued, neither petitioner in this case
had a personal stake in the current request for prospective relief, so neither
had standing.293
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Stevens attacked the certification of
Hamacher as a class representative. 294 Justice Stevens noted that a class
representative "'must allege and show that they personally have been
injured, not that [the] injury has been suffered by other, unidentified mem-
bers of the class to which they belong and which they purport to
represent.' 295 Justice Stevens concluded that like the petitioners in Blum,
Hamacher did not have standing because he could not prove personal
injury.296 Justice Stevens respectfully dissented because neither petitioner
could prove a personal stake in the outcome and thus lacked Article III
standing.297
F. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT
Justice Souter agreed with Justice Stevens that Patrick Hamacher
lacked standing to challenge the University's admissions policy. 298 He
wrote separately to demonstrate that even with the Court's current inter-
pretation of standing, Hamacher did not have standing. 299 In Part II, Justice
Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that even if the merits of the case
were reachable, the Court's judgment was incorrect. 300
291. Id.
292. Id. at 289 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001 (1982); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 406-07 (1981)).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
296. Id. at 290.
297. Id. at 290-91
298. Id. at 291 (Souter, J., dissenting).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 293.
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1. Hamacher Lacked Standing
Justice Souter argued that the Court's finding of standing was based on
two propositions. 30' First, both the transfer and freshmen admissions poli-
cies used race to achieve diversity of the student body.302 Second,
Hamacher had standing to challenge this use of diversity in any admissions
decision.303 Justice Souter argued that the Court granted standing to
Hamacher simply because his argument, if successful, would eliminate both
policies.304
2. The Admissions Policy was Constitutional
Justice Souter recognized that the Court had developed two positions
for admissions policies.305 First, Justice Souter noted that "Grutter re-
affirme[d] the permissibility of individualized consideration of race to
achieve a diversity of students, at least where race is not assigned a preor-
dained value in all cases." 306 Second, Bakke outlawed the use of racial
quotas.307 Justice Souter concluded that since the University's policy was
not a quota, it was closer to what Grutter reaffirmed than what Bakke
outlawed. 308
To prove his point, Justice Souter contrasted the rigid quota system of
Bakke with the University's plan where any applicant could compete for
any spot.309 Justice Souter compared the University's policy with gender-
sensitive hiring policies that had been upheld because they allowed all
applicants to compete for all spots.
310
Justice Souter admitted that the only potential problem with the
University's policy was that membership in a minority group entitled an
applicant to 20 points out of a total of 150 points. 31' However, Justice








309. Id. at 293-94 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)
(Powell, J., plurality)).
310. Id. at 294. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, the court
upheld a gender sensitive hiring program. 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987). Instead of requiring a quota,
the Agency's plan provided for no set number of women to be hired. Id. Instead of a set aside
plan, the plan required women to be weighed against all applicants. Id. The hiring plan only re-
quired that the sex be an additional factor in the hiring process. Id. Thus, the court upheld the
plan under Bakke. Id.
311. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 294 (2003).
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Souter noted that non-minority students could "receive twenty points for
athletic ability, socioeconomic disadvantage, [and] attendance at a socio-
economically disadvantaged or predominantly minority high school."312 In
addition, they could also receive ten points for being residents of Michigan,
six points for being a resident in an underrepresented Michigan county, or
five points for leadership and service.313 Justice Souter noted that the ma-
jority objected to this policy because minority applicants automatically
were given a large award of twenty points.314
Justice Souter argued that Justice Powell's "plus" factors had to be
assigned a numerical value out of necessity. 315 Justice Souter reasoned that
"[s]ince college admission is not left entirely too inarticulate intuition, it is
hard to see what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a
relevant characteristic .... "316 Justice Souter concluded that the University
accomplished the same "holistic review" of applicants by use of a num-
bered scale that the law school achieved using different means, which was
upheld by the Court in Grutter.317
Furthermore, Justice Souter argued that the twenty point award was not
so large as to guarantee admission.318 On the contrary, non-minority stu-
dents could achieve higher selection scores than minorities based on non-
racial factors.319 The fact that "virtually every qualified underrepresented
minority applicant" is admitted could indicate that very few qualified
minority applicants apply, or that self-selection results in a strong minority
pool.320
312. Id. at 294-95.




317. Id. In Grutter, the University's Law School admissions policy was upheld because each
student's application was given a "holistic review." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337
(2003). During the admissions process each application was reviewed individually. Id. The
admissions counselors then decided whether to admit the applicant in the light of all the
applicant's characteristics. Id. In this manner, the University considered all the ways the
applicant might contribute to educational diversity. Id. Justice Souter reasoned that although the
University did not look at each undergraduate application individually, the numbered scale
achieved the same goal by awarding points for more than just race. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 295 (2003).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 296. Justice Souter noted that twenty points were also awarded for nonracial
factors such as athletic prowess. Id. at 294-95. Thus, a white athlete with a strong ACT score and
GPA could outscore a minority with a lower ACT and GPA. Id.
320. Id. at 296 (citing Respondent Bollinger's Brief at 39, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516); Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 11 la, Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S.
1044 (2002) (No. 02-516)).
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Justice Souter concluded that it must be the size of the bonus that
makes the majority suspicious, but mere suspicion is not enough to justify
the majority's conclusion. 32' Justice Souter noted that the district court did
not find the assigned point value troubling and made only limited findings
on the work of the ARC.322 Justice Souter argued that there was no record
of the case-by-case work of the committee, so the Court should have va-
cated and remanded this case.323 By ruling against the University without a
full record of the activities of the committee, he argued that the Court
penalized the University for being honest about its program.
324
Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that the University's plan was
preferable to some race-neutral alternatives like percentage plans.3 25 He
rejected these plans because they were meant to achieve the same result in
an underhanded way. 326 Justice Souter stated that the winner should not be
the party who hides the ball. 327 Justice Souter concluded that even if the
petitioners had Article III standing, he would have affirmed the granting of
summary judgment to the University by the district court.
328
G. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT, JOINED BY JUSTICE SOUTER AND
JUSTICE BREYER IN PART I
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, disagreed with
the majority's use of one standard to judge all racial classifications.
32 9
Justice Ginsburg argued that one standard would only be appropriate if the
country had fully recovered from its history of discrimination. 330 Justice
Ginsburg relied on voluminous government census data showing large
disparities between whites and African Americans in nearly every important
321. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality)).
322. Id. (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 829-30 (E.D. Mich. 2000)).
323. Id. at 297.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 297-98. The United States in its amicus brief contended that the University could
achieve many of the same outcomes with a race-neutral percentage plan. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No.
02-516). These plans guaranteed admission for a certain percentage of graduates from each of the
state's high schools. Id. The United States argued that similar plans had been adopted with suc-
cess in California, Florida, and Texas. Id.
326. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003). Justice Souter argued that these policies
were designed to encourage admission of minorities from inner city high schools. Id. at 297.
327. Id. at 298.
328. Id.
329. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
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category measured.331 Justice Ginsburg argued that these disparities were
present in unemployment, poverty, and access to health care.332
Additionally, she cited large amounts of data showing the superior
quality of white schools when compared to primarily minority institu-
tions.333 These disparities also indicated that African-American adults
earned less money than whites, even with equivalent levels of education.334
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg argued that in implementing the Equal
Protection Clause, lawmakers may properly differentiate between policies
of exclusion and inclusion. 335 She argued that actions designed to burden
minorities were not in the same category as those actions designed to
remedy past discrimination. 336
Justice Ginsburg argued that racial classifications were inherently
"suspect," not because they can never be used, but because racial classi-
fications have been used as a tool of oppression. 337 Thus, if a classification
was designed to achieve equality rather than to oppress, it was not
suspect.338
Justice Ginsburg admitted that the mere claim that equality was the
goal was not enough to immunize the University's policy from judicial
scrutiny. 339 Justice Ginsburg argued that close scrutiny was needed to weed
out malicious classifications from the benign and to ensure that any racial
preference was not so large as to harm the previously favored groups. 340
331. Id. at 299 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002 368 tbl.562 (2002) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT]).
332. Id. (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 291 tbl.A (2001); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000 391 (Table A) (2001)).
333. Id. at 299-300 (citing James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,
273-74 (1999)). The data showed that minority students at under funded schools were more likely
to score poorly on standardized tests, and more likely to drop out. Id. at 300 n.5.
334. Id. at 300 (citing STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 140, supra note 331, at tbl.21 1).
335. Id. at 301 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
336. Id. (citing Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-
34 (1988)).
337. Id. (citing Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32
(2d Cir. 1968)).
338. Id. (citing Norwalk, 395 F.2d at 932).
339. Id. at 302. Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority that strict scrutiny should be
applied to all racial classifications. Id. Instead, she argued that racial classifications designed to
remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination should be allowed so long as they serve a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id. (citing United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 876 (1966)).




Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg found no fault with the University's ad-
missions policy. 341 She noted that the University was one of the top schools
in the country, and admitted only qualified applicants. 34 2 The minority
applicants admitted generally fit into the historically oppressed group.
343
Justice Ginsburg noted that the program was not designed to decrease the
number of whites attending and that no seats were reserved on the basis of
race. 344 Furthermore, she concluded that white students were not harmed
because their chances of being admitted were not greatly diminished be-
cause of the program. 34
5
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the other dissenters and refuted the
United States' claim that the University should implement a percentage
plan as an effective race-neutral alternative.346 She found these plans to be
"disingenuous" because they were not race-neutral, but instead were de-
signed to accomplish the same goals as the current admissions plan.
34 7
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that as long as "racial oppression [was]
still visible in our society," universities will continue to maintain affirma-
tive action plans either openly or in secret. 348 She argued that by striking
down the University's policy, the Court would force universities to achieve
similar results in secret. 349
IV. IMPACT
Like any landmark case, the decision in Gratz elicited a wide range of
reactions.3 50 Even though the admissions policy in Gratz was found to be
unconstitutional, the University claimed victory because diversity was
recognized as a compelling interest. 351 President Bush, who filed an amicus
brief opposing the University, also claimed victory.352 In fact, the only
341. Id. at 302-03.
342. Id. at 303 (citing Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 108a, I lIa, Gratz v. Bollinger,
537 U.S. 1044 (2002) (No. 02-516)).
343. Id.
344. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 10, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-
516)).
345. Id. (citing Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Science Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002)).
346. Id. at 303 n.10.
347. Id. (citing Respondents' Brief at 44, Gratz (No. 02-516)).
348. Id. at 304.
349. Id.
350. What Do U-M Court Rulings Mean?, DETROIT NEWS, June 24, 2003, available at 2003
WL 57064239.
351. Terrence J. Pell, Court Gives New Life to Quota Camouflage, NEWSDAY, July 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57985827.
352. James Gerstenzang, Affirmative Action Survives; The Supreme Court Upheld Race as a
Factor in University Admissions but Struck Down Quota-Type Systems in Another Ruling,
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party not claiming outright victory was the Center for Individual Rights
(CIR), which won the lawsuit.353 The most immediate impact of Gratz v.
Bollinger has been in the field of higher education. 354
A. CHANGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
In response to the rulings in Gratz and Grutter, the University of
Michigan unveiled a new admissions policy expressly relying on the
Court's decisions.355 The new policy now states:
The new application form is designed to facilitate individualized,
holistic consideration, with special attention to providing oppor-
tunities for all applicants to demonstrate the ways in which they
would contribute to the life and diversity of the University. The
changes to the application form do not alter the factors considered
in the process (e.g., socioeconomic status, race or national origin,
special skills and talents, unusual life experiences, etc.); they
simply make it possible for each applicant to provide more
detailed and individualized information about these criteria, so as
to facilitate the particularized application review approved by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.356
Although the most immediate impact was on the University of
Michigan, Gratz will have a broader impact, because poorly drawn admis-
sions policies will always run afoul of Title VI.357 Title VI prohibits
institutions which receive federal money from discriminating based on
race. 358 Almost all public and private universities receive federal money, so
all will be affected.359
Finally, to the chagrin of anti-affirmative action proponents, some
schools that did not have race-sensitive policies before the rulings are now
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 24, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 57954447. President Bush
stated, "The [C]ourt has made clear that colleges and universities must engage in a serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives." id.
353. Pell, supra note 351, at 1 (recognizing that the decision, and the University's reaction to
it, will lead to more litigation).
354. The Admissions Review Process: Mission Statement and Overview, at
http://www.admissions.umich.edu/process/review/intro (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
355. Id.
356. Id. (emphasis added).
357. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003).
358. Charles Lane, O'Connor Questions Foes of U-Michigan Policy; Justice Seen as
Holding Likely Swing Vote as Court Weighs Affirmative Action Cases, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.




implementing them. 360 These schools now believe that it is possible to draft
a policy that is constitutionally tested and court approved. 361 In addition to
the impact in higher education, the Court's ruling will also be felt in the
business world.362
B. CHANGES IN BUSINESS RECRUITMENT
In the two University of Michigan cases, over eighty business organi-
zations and corporations filed amicus briefs in support of the University's
diversity-based rational.363 Although the Court's decisions did not deal di-
rectly with business, many employers are thinking about implementing
diversity-based recruitment policies.3 64 Some believe that this rationale can
be easily translated into the business environment. 365 However, others
believe that it will be difficult.366
Either way, under the diversity rationale, companies would have to be
careful in crafting race-sensitive recruitment policies. 367 Failure to do so
will assuredly lead to more expensive litigation. 368 The decision in Gratz
will probably not have much of an impact in states where there is a racially
homogenous demographic.
C. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA
Most if not all the universities in North Dakota must comply with the
Court's new stance on affirmative action. 369 However, North Dakota does
not have any selective universities, so the effects will likely be limited only
360. John Turner, U. South Carolina: Admissions Policy Might Include Race at U. of South
Carolina, THE GAMECOCK VIA U-WIRE, Aug. 27, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 59919615;
see Pell, supra note 351 at 1.
361. Turner, supra note 360, at 1.
362. Michael T. Burr, High Court Opens Door to Race-Conscious Recruitment: U. of Mich.
Ruling Provides Insights for Corporate Employers, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2003, at 1-5.
363. Id. at 3.
364. Id. at 1.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 3. Robert Hale, a partner with Goodwin Proctor in Boston explains, "First... the
primary dispute in the University of Michigan cases involved the state and its institutions-not
private companies. And second, the court continued Bakke's tradition of deference to the aca-
demic freedom of colleges and universities." Id. Hale continued, "In the private employment
area, you have a basic standard in the Civil Rights Act." Id. This Act prohibits discrimination in
employment unless it is designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Id.
367. Id. at 4. A company looking to establish such a program should show (1) that they
exhausted all race-neutral alternatives; and (2) that the program is necessary to advance a
compelling business need such as fundamental improvements in operations or management. Id.
368. Id.
369. LANE, supra note 358, at 60.
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to professional schools with limited enrollments. 370 This would include the
University of North Dakota School of Law.371 However, all applicants
already receive a complete evaluation of his or her file by each admissions
counselor no matter what his or her race may be.372 This process is based
on Powell's opinion in Bakke, so no applicant is either exclusively admitted
or denied based on numbers alone. 373
V. CONCLUSION
In Gratz, the majority held that petitioners had standing to challenge
the University's admissions policy. 374 Next, the Court found that even
though diversity was a compelling interest, the University's admissions
program was too mechanical to be narrowly tailored. 375 Finally, because
the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, it also violated Title VI and
42 U.S.C. § 1981.376
Daniel P. Bakken*
370. Interview with Kathryn Rand, Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota,
in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
371. Id.
372. Interview with Randy Lee, Professor of Law and Chair of Admissions Committee,
University of North Dakota, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
373. Id.
374. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003).
375. Id. at 275.
376. Id. at 275-76.
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